The Long War

One thing that proponents of a quick pullout of US forces from Iraq seem to fail to recognize is that no matter how unpleasant the prospect may be, the reality is that unless we want to pull up the drawbridge and hunker down in Fortress America, we're likely going to be engaged in similar counterinsurgency struggles in the foreseeable future. We can leave Iraq if we choose, but at some point we're going to have to figure out how to defeat enemies who recognize that while they can never beat the US on the battlefield, they can wear down our will to fight through asymmetrical warfare.

In the October 2006 edition of Armed Forces Journal, Lt. Col. John A. Nagl and Lt. Col Paul L Yingling propose some new rules for new enemies in The Long War:

Critics may object that the proposals outlined above--language training, higher education and force-structure redesign--are enormously expensive. These critics are correct. Counterinsurgency is an intensely human activity and requires significant investment in human capital. Providing continuous security to civilian populations and encouraging political and economic development cannot be done by machines at standoff ranges. There are many opportunities for material solutions to aid soldiers in COIN operations. However, there is no substitute for adaptive, intelligent and disciplined soldiers and leaders operating in close contact with host-nation security forces and the civilian populations they secure. The Long War can be fought only at close range.

Furthermore, the costs of transforming the Army for the Long War pale in comparison to the risks of failing to do so. The U.S. is already fighting active insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. If we fail to bring stability to these states, their territories and populations will soon become instruments for spreading instability throughout the greater Middle East. Fragile governments such as those in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan may fall, endangering global oil supplies and nuclear nonproliferation controls. If we fail to dominate this conflict at the lower end of the spectrum, we may indeed find the need to fight a major theater war to impose stability on a region too vital to ignore. The costs of doing so will be exponentially greater than our current operations.

We have responsibility.

Lt. Col Nagl is also the author of the highly-touted Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, which compares the British military's ability to adapt and learn in Malaya with the corresponding failure of the US to do so in Vietnam. This Saturday, he will be our guest on the Northern Alliance Radio Network at noon central time. Lt. Col. Nagl has served in Iraq as well and we'll be discussing both the theory and actual practice of successful counterinsurgency operations.

Listen live locally to all six hours of the NARN on WWTC AM1280 The Patriot (and stock up on last minute stocking stuffers at the Patriot Holiday Christmas Store--I've got tickets to "50 Ways To Leave Your Clutter" coming for the whole Fraters crew) or on the internet stream. Don't you dare miss it. You have responsibility.