Hand In Glove

Bing West and Hans Binnendijk suggest the U.S. adopt one of the key lessons from Vietnam and embed more troops with Iraqi units (WSJ-sub req):

But any diplomatic package will fail unless Iraq's security forces restore order. The only way to rapidly do that is to shift platoons from American battalions into 140 Iraqi army battalions and critical police stations. Currently the U.S. has about a dozen military advisers working in each Iraqi battalion. These advisers spend their time as managers. They are too few to give combat advice and moral reassurance out on the streets during daily operations.

As a result, Iraqi platoons, lacking self-confidence, restrict their patrolling in the dangerous areas where they are most needed. To infuse combat confidence in each Iraqi battalion, we propose embedding about 60 advisers -- by transferring a reinforced platoon from every U.S. infantry battalion in Iraq. Each American soldier and Marine so deployed would be a force multiplier, greatly increasing the effectiveness of the Iraqi soldiers. The total number of advisers would expand to 20,000, plus additional support. Air and artillery strikes would be on call. Additional U.S. battalions would be needed to provide Quick Reaction Forces should the embedded forces need them. Special Forces commandos would still seek out al Qaeda operatives anywhere. U.S. units would maintain security in parts of Baghdad and 10 other key cities.

The huge increase in advisers would be offset by a drawdown of American conventional battalions and base support units. American-only patrols are becoming counterproductive, with fewer direct enemy engagements, more sniper and IED attacks, and more alienated Iraqis. In return for the embedding, the U.S. would insist that Iraqi officers accused of malfeasance by their advisory teams be relieved of duty.

By shifting missions from American-only patrolling to embedded combat advisers, the overall U.S. troop requirement might be cut nearly in half during the coming year. But the effectiveness of the mission should increase, based on past experience. In Vietnam, the Marine Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program deployed over 100 squads to live in hamlets with Popular Force units. Large areas were patrolled at low cost and 60% of the Marines involved extended at the end of their tours. Last year in northwest Iraq, the American commander in al Qaim replicated the CAP experience by integrating his battalion into local police and army forces and driving al Qaeda out of the city.

Such an integrated approach, with advisors living, training, and fighting alongside native troops to provide needed backbone, has proven successful in past counterinsurgencies. It usually results in better intelligence gathering and helps minimize the overt presence of the foreign "occupier." Why it hasn't been widely adopted in Iraq up to this point is a bit puzzling. Let's hope that the advice offered by West and Binnendijk become part of the much talked about "go long" approach the military is considering.