Fraters Libertas

The Problems With Intelligence And Preemption

In the wake of the September 11th attacks the Bush administration came under quite a bit of fire for perceived intelligence failures. Critics implied that it would have been possible for the administration to use the intelligence available to prevent the attacks. There was indeed a great deal of intelligence before 9/11 that indicated that some sort of attack was imminent. And not all of it was from the most reliable of sources (information coming out of Afghanistan for instance was suspect). But that wasn't a concern for those who thought that the administration had failed in its intelligence duties. They faulted the administration for NOT considering ALL the intelligence available, tying together all these disparate strings to foresee the threat, and acting to prevent it.

But isn't this exactly what the Bush administration did in the case of Iraq?

Now critics are harping because ONE of the many threads of intelligence that the administration used to make the case for preemptive action against Iraq has turned out not to have been accurate. If the Niger uranium connection was the foundation that the case for war was built on then perhaps they would a point. But it wasn't. It was merely another plank in a very long bridge that was used to justify action. Should the whole structure be torn down because one plank was rotten?

Back to 9/11 for a moment let us imagine that the administration had correctly interpreted the intelligence before 9/11and decided that a major attack was going to take place in the United States and decided to act to prevent it. None of the intelligence specifically spelled out the exact plans for the attacks or indicated the identity of the nineteen men who would take part. The only methods that I can see that would have prevented the attacks would have been a dramatic heightening of airport security and the mass detentions of thousands of Arab and Muslim men in the United States (imagine the outcry that would have resulted). Unless the administration was very lucky and happened to nab one or more of the nineteen potential hijackers with evidence of the detailed plans for the attacks no one could really even say for certain just what had been prevented. Before 9/11 it wasn't possible to imagine 9/11. The administration would have claimed credit for preventing a major terrorist attack and justified their actions to prevent it. But critics would have sniped that they had overreacted, that there wasn't solid proof of a threat, and if ANY of the intelligence they used to build the case for action turned out to be false the critics would be all over them just as they are today over the Iraq intelligence flap.

That's the problem with intelligence and preemption. You are expected to utilize all available information to analyze threats and if necessary act upon them. But usually you can't prove beyond doubt that your actions prevented a specific attack from taking place and the intelligence that you used to arrive at your decision is going to be questioned by your opposition and if any flaws are found they're going to hammer you for it.

If you act on intelligence that is possibly not 100% accurate you will be criticized. But if you don't act on intelligence that is possibly not 100% accurate you will be criticized as well.

Back to Bart Simpson's paradox, "Damned if do. Damned if you don't."

After 9/11 I'm much more willing to live with the former.