Much Ado About Something?

When the news broke last night about Sandy Berger and the "misplaced" documents (hey Sandy, is that a classified dossier in your pants or are you just glad to see me?) my initial reaction was that people were making far too much of the story. Yes, he probably broke the rules. And yes, if it was Condi Rice the mainstream press would be all over it like lonely bloggers on Plain Layne, but I was willing to give Berger the benefit of the doubt. Maybe he's got a bit of the absent minded professor in him I thought, and honestly was not aware of his illegal actions.

But today after reading this post at Captain's Quarters I'm beginning to have doubts:

For my money, that's at least one "inadvertently" too many, and that is not a literary criticism. Perhaps this explanation will fly for those who have never worked around classified documents, but since I spent three years producing such material, I can tell you that it's impossible to "inadvertently" take or destroy them. For one thing, such documents are required to have covers -- bright covers in primary colors that indicate their level of classification. Each sheet of paper is required to have the classification level of the page (each page may be classified differently) at the top and bottom of each side of the paper. Documents with higher classifications are numbered, and each copy is tracked with an access log, and nowadays I suppose they're tracking them by computers.

Under these rules, it's difficult to see how anyone could "inadvertently" mix up handwritten notes with classified documents, especially when sticking them into one's jacket and pants. Furthermore, as Clinton's NSA, Berger would have been one of the people responsible for enforcing these regimens, not simply subject to them. The DOD makes these rules crystal clear during the clearance process at each level of access, and security officers (which Berger clearly was) undergo even further training and assessment on security procedures. "Inadvertent" and "sloppiness", in the real context of secured documentation, not only don't qualify as an excuse but don't even register as a possibility.

As Ed goes on to say, it's far too early in the game to tell what Berger's motives might have been, and perhaps there is nothing sinister about what he did. But his original excuse about "sloppiness" doesn't seem to hold water anymore.

More from Ed on this story here and here.